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INTRODUCTION
After the deployment of various vehicular tech-
nologies, such as toll collection or active road
signs, vehicular communication (VC) systems
have emerged. They comprise network nodes,
that is, vehicles and road-side infrastructure
units (RSUs) equipped with onboard sensory,
processing, and wireless communication mod-
ules. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication can enable a
range of applications to enhance transportation
safety and efficiency, as well as infotainment.
For example, they can send warnings about envi-
ronmental hazards (e.g., ice on the pavement),
traffic and road conditions (e.g., emergency
braking, congestion, or construction sites), and
local (e.g., tourist) information.
The unique features of VC are a double-
edged sword: a rich set of tools will be available,
but a formidable set of abuses and attacks
becomes possible. Consider, for example, an
attacker that “contaminates” large portions of
the vehicular network with false information: A
single compromised vehicle can transmit false
hazard warnings, which can then be taken up by
all vehicles in both traffic streams; a tampered
vehicle that forges messages to masquerade as
an emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles
to slow down and yield; or a different type of
attacker that deploys a number of receivers and
records messages transmitted by vehicles, espe-
cially safety beacons that report a vehicle’s loca-
tion, to track the vehicle’s location and
transactions, and infer private information about
its driver and passengers.
It is clear that to thwart such attacks, security
and privacy-enhancing mechanisms are neces-
sary; in fact, they are a prerequisite for deploy-
ment. Otherwise, VC systems could make
anti-social and criminal behavior easier in ways
that would actually jeopardize the benefits of
their deployment. This has recently been well
understood in academia, the industry, and among
authorities; and a number of concerted efforts
have been undertaken to design security archi-
tectures for VC systems.
A prominent example of these efforts is our
three-year European-funded Secure Vehicular
Communications (SeVe-Com) project (http://
www.sevecom.org), which approaches its conclu-
sion at the end of 2008. In this project universi-
ties, car manufacturers, and car equipment
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suppliers collaborate on the design of a baseline
architecture that is practical and provides a level
of protection sought by users and legislators.
Our baseline architecture is based on well estab-
lished and understood cryptographic primitives,
but can also be tuned or augmented to meet
more stringent future requirements.
In this article we first discuss the capabilities
of attackers. Then we present the requirements
on which we base the development of our archi-
tecture. The basic aspects we seek to address are
identity and cryptographic key management, pri-
vacy protection, secure communication, and in-
car protection. Next, we provide details on
credential management and cryptographic sup-
port, which enable secure and privacy-enhancing
communication. We conclude with a short dis-
cussion that ushers in our second article, which
is concerned with implementation and perfor-
mance issues, and upcoming research challenges.
ADVERSARY MODEL
VC system entities can be correct or benign; that
is, they may comply with the implemented proto-
cols or deviate from the protocol definition (i.e.,
be faulty or adversarial). Adversarial behavior
can vary according to the implemented protocols
and the capabilities of the adversary. Its incen-
tive may be its own benefit or malice. Here, we
do not consider benign faults, for example, com-
munication errors, message delaying, or loss,
which can occur either under normal operational
conditions or due to equipment failure. Instead,
we focus on adversarial behavior that can cause
a much larger set of faults. We do not describe
attacks against individual VC protocols. Rather,
we survey the capabilities of adversaries and dis-
cuss aspects relevant to the VC context. A more
detailed exposition, which also discusses models
used in other types of distributed systems, is
available in [9].
Even though VC protocol implementations
will be proprietary, open definitions of the stan-
dards can provide attackers with detailed knowl-
edge about system operation. Any wireless device
that runs a rogue version of the VC protocol
stack poses a threat. Attackers can be either pas-
sive or active. 
Active adversaries can meaningfully modify in-
transit messages they relay, beyond the modifica-
tions the protocol definitions allow or require
them to perform. Or, more generally, they can
forge, i.e., synthesize in a manner non-compliant
to the protocols and system operation, and inject
messages. As adversaries are aware of the VC
protocols, they can choose any combination of
these actions according to their own prior obser-
vations (messages they received) and the proto-
col they attempt to compromise. An active
adversary may also jam communications, by
interfering deliberately to prevent other devices
within its range to communicate. Or it can replay
messages it receives, which were previously
transmitted by other system entities. In contrast
to active adversaries, passive attackers only learn
information about system entities and cannot
affect or change their behavior.
It is important to distinguish adversaries
equipped with cryptographic keys and creden-
tials that entitle them to participate in the execu-
tion of the VC system protocols. We denote
these adversaries internal. In contrast, adver-
saries that do not possess such keys and creden-
tials are external. We emphasize that the
possession of credentials does not guarantee cor-
rect operation of the nodes. For example,
onboard units (OBUs) can be tampered with
and their functionality modified (e.g., by
installing a rogue version of the protocol stack).
Or the cryptographic keys of an RSU or a vehi-
cle can be compromised (e.g., physically extract-
ed from an unattended vehicle) and utilized by
an adversarial device. In this case, a node with
multiple (compromised) keys could appear as
multiple nodes.
More generally, multiple adversarial nodes can
be present in the network at different locations.
They can act independently or may collude (i.e.,
exchange information and coordinate their
actions) in order to mount a more effective
attack.1 For example, they could all report an
imaginary event (e.g., traffic jam or accident) in
order to mislead correct nodes into thinking this
is indeed the case. Over time, the set of adver-
sarial nodes can change in both numbers and
locations. On one hand, the compromised nodes
(e.g., illegally modified vehicles) can increase
over time, as drivers may have some benefit in
doing so. On the other hand, fault detection
mechanisms and diagnostics along with policy
enforcement can lead to gradual eradication of
faulty devices.
Overall, however, it is reasonable to expect
that only a relatively small fraction of VC devices
would be adversaries. Of course, this depends on
the appropriate design of the system, which
should not allow easy abuse (e.g., malware prop-
agation). Moreover, the majority of users do not
have the expertise and motivation to tamper
with their VC devices, and maintenance can
address the majority of equipment faults.
Given a small fraction of faulty (adversarial)
devices, the adversary should have an overall
limited physical presence. As the transmission
range of faulty devices cannot be unbounded,
even if they have customized hardware that
exceeds the communication range of vehicular or
roadside devices, the adversaries can affect only
a fraction of the VC system area. Within this
area, they can cause denial of service and do so
in a selective manner (i.e., erase one or more
messages sent by other nodes). This does not
preclude a few adversarial devices surrounding a
correct node (vehicle) at some point in time. But
most often and in most locations, correct nodes
should encounter few or only a single adversary.
Due to the nature of VC systems, with vehi-
cles equipped with a number of sensors, an
exchange of false measurements can compro-
mise VC-enabled applications. An arguably con-
venient attack, in the sense that it may be
relatively easy to mount, would be to control the
sensory inputs to the OBU instead of attempting
to compromise the OBU or its cryptographic
keys. Tampering with a sensor or the OBU-sen-
sor connection may indeed be simpler. It is not
easy to classify an input-controlling adversary as
external or internal. On one hand, no access to
credentials and cryptographic material is neces-
1 We emphasize, though,
that even in that case,
adversaries are computa-
tionally limited and
unable to break keys of
other nodes.
Even though the 
VC protocol 
implementations will
be proprietary, open
definitions of the
standards can 
provide attackers
with detailed 
knowledge about
the system 
operation. Any 
wireless device that
runs a rogue version
of the VC protocol
stack poses a threat.
PAPADIMITRATOS LAYOUT  10/22/08  3:54 PM  Page 101
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on December 1, 2008 at 14:03 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
IEEE Communications Magazine • November 2008102
sary. On the other hand, messages generated
and transmitted due to an input-controlling
adversary originate from a legitimate system par-
ticipant. What we should note, though, is that
such an adversary is relatively weaker than an
internal one: Controlling inputs alone cannot
induce arbitrary behavior if self-diagnostics and
other controls are available and out of reach of
the adversary.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The problem at hand is to secure the operation
of VC systems by designing protocols that miti-
gate attacks and thwart deviations from the
implemented protocols to the greatest possible
extent. Different protocols have their own speci-
fications. Rather than providing an exhaustive
enumeration of sought after properties per pro-
tocol and application, first we identify a set of
standalone requirements. Then we outline a
number of example VC applications along with
the related security requirements.
The identified standalone security require-
ments are the following:
Message authentication and integrity, to protect
against any alteration and allow the receiver of a
message to corroborate the sender of the mes-
sage.
Message non-repudiation so that the sender of
a message cannot deny having sent a message.
Entity authentication so that a receiver is
ensured that the sender generated a message
and has evidence of the liveness of the sender. In
other words, ascertain that a received unmodi-
fied message was generated within an interval
[t – δ, t], with t the current time at the receiver
and δ > 0 a sufficiently small positive value.
Access control, to determine via specific sys-
tem-wide policies the assignment of distinct roles
to different types of nodes and their allowed
actions within the system. As part of access con-
trol, authorization establishes what each node is
allowed to do in the network, for example, which
types of messages it can insert in the network,
or, more generally, the protocols it is allowed to
execute.
Message confidentiality, to keep the content of
a message secret from those nodes not autho-
rized to access it.
Accountability, to be able to map security-
related events to system entities.
Privacy protection, to safeguard private infor-
mation of VC system users. This is a general
requirement that relates to the protection of pri-
vate information stored offline. In the context of
communication, which is the object of SeVe-
Com, we are interested in anonymity for the
actions (messages and transactions) of the vehi-
cles. We elaborate on the VC-specific aspects we
seek to address next.
For privacy, along with security, we focus on
private vehicles (e.g., excluding emergency vehi-
cles, buses, etc.) because the operation of all
other VC nodes, including RSUs, does not raise
any privacy concerns, and all the other nodes
should be readily identifiable. A primary concern
for VC systems is to provide location privacy, by
preventing others (any observer) from learning
past or future locations of a VC system user
(vehicle driver or passenger). With our focus on
VC, we can safeguard location privacy by seek-
ing to satisfy a more general requirement:
anonymity for vehicle message transmissions.
Ideally, it should be impossible for any
observer to learn if a specific vehicle has trans-
mitted or will transmit a message (more general-
ly, take an action according to a VC protocol),
and it should be impossible to link any two or
more messages (in general, actions) of the same
vehicle. Even if an observer tried to guess, there
should be only a low probability of linking a
vehicle’s actions or identifying it among the set
of all vehicles, that is, the anonymity set. We
elaborate on this notion below when we discuss
the management of identities and credentials for
VC system entities.
Rather than aiming for this strong anonymity,
we require a relatively weaker level of protec-
tion: messages should not allow for the identifi-
cation of their sender, and two or more messages
generated by the same vehicle should be difficult
to link to each other. More precisely, messages
produced by a vehicle over a protocol-selectable
period of time τ can always be linked by an
observer that receives them. But messages m1,
m2 generated at times t1, t2 such that t2 > t1 + τ
cannot. In terms of the observer, we assume that
its physical presence is bounded, as stated earlier
for the adversary.
In addition, features that enhance availability
are required to enable protocols and services to
remain operational even in the presence of
faults, malicious or benign. This implies
n Table 1. Sampled VC applications: features and importance of security requirements.
Feature Requirement
Application Safety App. V2V/V2I Multihop Authentication Integrity Privacy
Intersection collision warning √ V2V 2 2 2
Emergency vehicle signal √ V2I √ 2 2 0
Work zone warning √ V2I √ 1 2 0
Forward collision warning √ V2V √ 2 2 2
Cooperative adaptive cruise control V2V √ 2 2 2
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resilience to resource depletion attacks, as well
as self-stable protocols that resume their normal
operation after the “removal” of the faulty par-
ticipants.
Based on these considerations, SeVeCom
performed a detailed requirements analysis
where general application characteristics and
security requirements were assessed for a large
number of VC applications [6]. Table 1 shows a
small excerpt from this analysis, with higher val-
ues indicating the high importance of a given
requirement. For example, for a work zone
warning message, it may be relatively low in
importance to rigidly determine its recency. For
a collision avoidance application, though, it is
crucial to ensure the message recency. Of course,
for both applications, it is critical to ensure that
no message content is fabricated by an attacker.
Regarding privacy protection, this is not required
for infrastructure- or public-vehicle-sent mes-
sages such as work zone and emergency vehicle
warnings.
SECURE VC SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our architecture addresses the following funda-
mental issues:
• Identity, credential, and key management
• Secure communication
Seeking to satisfy the requirements we outlined
earlier in this article, we focus primarily on
securing the operation of the wireless part of the
VC system and on enhancing the privacy of its
users. We are fully aware of the projected coex-
istence of VC-specific and TCP/IP protocol
stacks in VC systems. Moreover, toward further
strengthening our architecture, we have investi-
gated and developed approaches to address in-
car protection and data consistency, discussed in
[7]. An abstract view of the secure VC system,
with nodes (vehicles and RSUs) and authorities
(CAA and CAB), is shown in Fig. 1. We outline
next the main elements of our architecture.
AUTHORITIES
Drawing from the analogy with existing adminis-
trative processes and automotive authorities (e.g.,
city or state transit authorities), we assume that a
large number of certification authorities (CAs)
will be instantiated. Each CA is responsible for a
region (national territory, district, county, etc.),
and manages identities and credentials of all
nodes registered with it. To enable interactions
between nodes from different regions, CAs pro-
vide certificates for other CAs (cross-certification)
or provide foreigner certificates to vehicles that are
registered with another CA when they cross the
geographical boundaries of their region [10].
NODE IDENTIFICATION
Each node is registered with only one CA, and
has a unique long-term identity and a pair of pri-
vate and public cryptographic keys, and it is
equipped with a long-term certificate. A list of
node attributes and a lifetime are included in the
certificate that the CA issues upon node regis-
tration and upon certificate expiration. The CA
is also responsible for the eviction of nodes or
the withdrawal of compromised cryptographic
keys via the revocation of the corresponding cer-
tificates. In all cases the interaction of nodes
with the CA is infrequent and intermittent, with
the roadside infrastructure acting as a gateway
to and from the vehicular part of the network,
with the use of other infrastructure (e.g., cellu-
lar) also being possible. The conceptual view of
VC nodes is illustrated in Fig. 2. The node iden-
tity and credential management and the role of
the hardware security module (HSM), methods
to secure V2V and V2I communication, and
CA-vehicle interactions (V2CA) that include the
issuance of short-term credentials to secure vehi-
cle transmissions are discussed in the rest of the
article. The in-car system and data processing
functionality are discussed in [7].
HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE
We envision that both vehicles and RSUs are
equipped with an HSM, whose purpose is to
store and physically protect sensitive information
and provide a secure time base. This information
is primarily private keys for signature generation.
If modules were to be tampered with to extract
private keys, the physical protection of the unit
would ensure that the sensitive information (pri-
vate keys) would be erased, thus preventing the
adversary from obtaining them. In addition, the
HSM performs all private key cryptographic
operations with the stored keys in order to
ensure that sensitive information never leaves
the physically secured HSM environment. Essen-
tially, the HSM is the basis of trust; without it,
private keys could be compromised, and their
holders could masquerade as legitimate system
nodes.
SECURE COMMUNICATION
Digital signatures are the basic tools to secure
communications and are used for all messages.
To satisfy both the security and anonymity
requirements, we rely on a pseudonymous authen-
tication approach. Rather than utilizing the same
long-term public and private key for securing
communications, each vehicle utilizes multiple
short-term private-public key pairs and certifi-
cates. A mapping between the short-term cre-
dentials and the long-term identity of each node
is maintained by the CA.
The basic idea is that:
• Each vehicle is equipped with multiple cer-
tified public keys (pseudonyms) that do not
reveal the node identity.
n Figure 1. Abstract view of the secure vehicular communication system.
Secure wireline
communication
Secure and privacy-enhancing
V2V and V2I single- and multi-
hop wireless communication
CAA
RSUA RSUB
CAB
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• The vehicle uses each of them for a short
period of time, and then switches to anoth-
er, not previously used pseudonym.
This way, messages signed under different
pseudonyms cannot be linked. Signatures, calcu-
lated over the message payload, a timestamp,
and the coordinates of the sender, can be gener-
ated by the originator of a message, as well as
relaying nodes, depending on the protocol func-
tionality. We provide security for frequently
broadcast safety beacon messages, restricted flood-
ing of messages within a geographical region or a
hop-distance from the sender, and position-based
routing used to transmit messages through a sin-
gle route of relay nodes, where the nodes select
as the next hop their neighbor with minimum
remaining geographical distance to the destina-
tion position.
CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT AND
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT
The management of credentials, both short- and
long-term, is undertaken by the CAs that are
also responsible for the revocation of credentials
for any node if needed, as well as holding the
node accountable by mapping node communica-
tions to its long-term identity. Public key opera-
tions are performed by the OBU, but all private
key operations are performed by the HSM,
which is essentially the trusted computing base
of the secure VC system.
IDENTITY AND CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT
Long-Term Identification — Each node X has a
unique long-term identity IDX, which will be the
outcome of an agreement between car manufactur-
ers and authorities, similar to the use of vehicle
identification numbers (VINs). Identifiers of the
same format will be assigned both to vehicles and
roadside units. Each identity is associated with a
cryptographic key pair (SKX, PKX) and a set of
attributes of node X. The attributes reflect technical
characteristics of the node equipment (e.g., type,
dimensions, sensors, and computing platform), as
well as the role of the node in the system. Nodes
can be, for example, private or public vehicles
(buses), vehicles with special characteristics (police
patrol cars), or RSUs, with or without any special
characteristics (offering connectivity to the Inter-
net). The assignment of an identity, the selection of
attributes appropriate for each node, and the gen-
eration of the certificate are performed offline at
the time the node is registered with the CA. The
lifetime of the certificate should be long, following
the node life cycle (or a significant fraction of it).
Short-Term Identification — To obtain
pseudonyms, a vehicle V’s HSM generates a set
of key pairs {(SK1V, PK
1
V), …, (SK
n
V, PK
n
V)} and
sends the public keys to a corresponding CA via
a secured communication channel. V utilizes its
long-term identity IDV to authenticate itself to
the CA. The CA signs each of the public keys,
PKjV, and generates a set of pseudonyms for V.
Each pseudonym contains an identifier of the
CA, the lifetime of the pseudonym, the public
key, and the signature of the CA, and thus, no
information about the identity of the vehicle.
Pseudonyms are stored and managed in the
onboard pseudonym pool, with their correspond-
ing secret keys kept in the HSM. This ensures
that each vehicle has exactly one key pair (its
own pseudonym and private key) that is active
during each time period. Moreover, once the
switch from the (SKjV, PK
j
V) to the j + 1st key
pair (SKj+1V , PK
j+1
V  ) is made, no further messages
can be signed with SKjV, even if the certificate for
PKjV is not yet expired. In other words,
n Figure 2. Conceptual secure VC architecture view: node functionality.
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pseudonymity cannot be abused: for example, a
rogue vehicle cannot sign multiple beacons, each
with a different SKjV, over a short period, and
thus cannot appear as multiple vehicles.2
A vehicle needs to contact the CA, infre-
quently but regularly, to obtain a new set of
pseudonyms. For example, if a vehicle utilizes
pseudonyms in set i, it obtains the (i + 1)st set
of pseudonyms while it can still operate with the
ith set. It switches to the (i + 1)st set once no
pseudonym in the ith set can be used. We term
this process a pseudonym refill.
Due to the requirement for accountability,
the CA archives the issued pseudonyms together
with the vehicle’s long-term identity. In case of
an investigation, an authorized party can ask the
CA to perform a pseudonym resolution: reveal
the link of a specific pseudonym to the long-
term identity of the vehicle (this leading further
to its registered owner).
By using the same pseudonym only for a short
period of time and then switching to a new one,
vehicle activities can be linked only during the
period when the same pseudonym is used.
Changing pseudonyms makes it difficult for an
adversary to link messages from the same vehicle
and track its movements. However, the inclusion
of the identity of the CAA issuing the credential
(pseudonym) implies that the vehicle is part of
the set of all vehicles registered with CAA. In
fact, this is the anonymity set of vehicle V. This
implies that, for example, a Swiss vehicle should
be anonymous within the set of all Swiss vehi-
cles.
This division of vehicles into disjoint subsets,
one per CA, allows an observer to rule out a sig-
nificant portion of vehicles given geographical
constraints. Consider again a Swiss vehicle, driv-
ing in the East Balkans, where it is not likely to
encounter numerous other vehicles with the
same registration. An observer could correctly
guess with high probability that all Swiss
pseudonyms (and thus associated messages) are
used by the same Swiss vehicle. To prevent such
inferences, we require that vehicles crossing the
boundaries of a foreign region, B, obtain short-
term credentials from the local CAB [10]. In our
example V would have to first prove to CAB it is
registered with CAA, then obtain pseudonyms by
CAB, and use them exclusively while in region B.
This way, it would avoid “standing out” in region
B, appearing to any observer of the VC system
traffic as part of the anonymity set B.
HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE
The HSM is the trusted computing base of the
SeVeCom security architecture. It stores the pri-
vate cryptographic key material and provides
cryptographic functions to be used by other
modules. The HSM is physically separated from
the OBU, and it has some tamper-resistant prop-
erties in order to protect the private key materi-
al against physical attacks. The HSM consists of
a CPU, some non-volatile memory, a built-in
clock, and some I/O interface. In addition, the
HSM has a built-in battery in order to power the
clock, and the tamper detection and reaction cir-
cuitry.
The main HSM functions include crypto-
graphic operations, as well as key and device
management functions. The main cryptographic
operations provided by the HSM are digital sig-
nature generation and decryption of encrypted
messages. The digital signature generation func-
tion is mainly used by the secure communication
module for signing outgoing messages.
The HSM always includes a timestamp in
every signature it generates, which makes it pos-
sible to detect replay attacks. The decryption
function is mainly used by the pseudonym han-
dling application that receives the anonymous
certificates in an encrypted form from the
pseudonym provider. The HSM handles short-
term keys for the short-term identification and
long-term keys for the long-term identification
of the vehicle. These keys are generated by the
HSM, and only the public keys are output from
the device. The generation of short-term keys
can be initiated by any application running on
the OBU. In contrast, the long-term keys are
generated at manufacturing time; however, they
can be updated later by trusted authorities.
Device management and long-term key
updates are achieved through signed commands
from the CA. In order to verify the signature on
these commands, the HSM stores trusted root
public keys that are loaded into the device dur-
ing the initialization procedure in a secure envi-
ronment. We envision two such root public keys,
K1 and K2, in the HSM, with the corresponding
private keys held by the CA. If one of the CA’a
private keys is compromised, the corresponding
public key, say K1, can be revoked, as discussed
in the next paragraph. The revocation command
must be signed with the private key correspond-
ing to K1 itself. Once K1 is revoked, a new key
K′1 can be loaded into the HSM by a command
signed with the private key corresponding to K2.
In addition, when K1 is revoked, the HSM does
not accept commands aimed at revoking K2. This
scheme ensures secure root key update unless
both root keys are compromised.
As discussed next, CA commands can include
revocation of the entire device. The revocation
of the HSM is achieved by a signed kill com-
mand that deletes every piece of information
from the memory, making the device unusable.
Further device management functions include
device initialization and clock synchronization.
During device initialization, the main parameters
of the HSM as well as the root public keys are
loaded in the HSM. Clock synchronization allows
for synchronizing the internal clock of the HSM
to a trusted external clock.
REVOCATION
The certificates of faulty nodes have to be
revoked to prevent them from causing damage
to the VC system. Revocation can be decided by
the CA for administrative or technical reasons.
The basic mechanism to achieve this is certifi-
cate revocation lists (CRLs) the CA creates and
authenticates. The challenge is to distribute the
CRLs effectively and efficiently, which can be
achieved by a combination of methods illustrat-
ed in Fig. 3.
We leverage on the roadside infrastructure to
distribute CRLs. We find that with RSUs placed
on average some kilometers apart and with CRL
distribution by each RSU at a few kilobits per
2 The CA could prevent
abuse of the pseudonymity
by issuing short-term cer-
tificates with nonoverlap-
ping lifetimes. We also
note that multiple
pseudonyms can be active
simultaneously only when
used for completely dis-
joint communication
(e.g., one for all safety
messaging and one for
infotainment downloads).
The certificates of
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second, all vehicles can obtain CRLs of hun-
dreds of kilobytes over a time period of an aver-
age commute [10]. This is achieved primarily
through the use of encoding CRLs into numer-
ous (cryptographically) self-verifiable pieces and
low-rate broadcast transmission of CRL pieces.
In areas with no RSUs the V2V CRL distribu-
tion initiated by vehicles that were previously in
contact with RSUs, or use of other communica-
tion technologies, could have a complementary
role. The size of CRLs and the overall amount
of revocation information to be distributed can
still be a challenge. At first, collaboration
between CAs so that CRLs contain only regional
revocation information can keep the CRL size
low [10].
Revocation can leverage on the HSM, with
the CA initiating the Revocation of the HSM
(RHSM) protocol [13], issuing a “kill” command
signed with the private key corresponding to one
of the root public keys. If an HSM receives a kill
command, it deletes everything from its memory,
including its own private keys, to prevent the
generation of any new keys or signatures by the
compromised module. The CA determines the
location of the vehicle and sends the kill com-
mand via the nearest RSU(s). The HSM has to
confirm the reception of this command by send-
ing an ACK before erasing the long-term signa-
ture generation key (SKX). If communication via
the RSUs fails (i.e., an ACK is not received after
a timeout), the CA can broadcast the command
via the radio data system (RDS).
If the adversary controls the CA-HSM com-
munication, CRL-based revocation has to be
performed. This can also be done via the Revo-
cation Using Compressed Certificate Revocation
Lists (RC2RL) protocol [13], which can reduce
the size of CRLs by a lossy compression scheme,
notably Bloom filters, to the extent they could be
transmitted even over the RDS. The identifica-
tion of a revoked certificate in the Bloom filter
is always possible (zero false negative rate),
along with a configurable low false positive rate.
An occasional revocation of “innocent” creden-
tials, traded off for compression (efficiency), is
not an issue when RC2RL revokes large num-
bers of short-term credentials.
The inclusion of credentials in a CRL implies
that the CA has established the need to revoke
the node. If this is because of faulty behavior,
the absence of an omnipresent monitoring facili-
ty makes detection harder. Moreover, CRLs will
be issued rather infrequently (e.g., once per
day), thus leaving a vulnerability window until a
faulty node is revoked. To address this, we pro-
pose that misbehavior detection be left to vehi-
cles, which can then defend themselves by locally
voting off and excluding misbehaving vehicles.
We propose the use of two localized defense
schemes, Misbehavior Detection System (MDS)
and Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Eval-
uators (LEAVE) [13]. The first allows the neigh-
bors of a misbehaving node to detect it, and the
second enables them to exclude it from the local
VC operation. After a LEAVE execution, the
evaluators report the misbehaving node to the
CA; a node can be revoked by the CA, using
one of the previously described approaches,
after having been evicted a threshold number of
times by its (changing) neighbors.
SECURE COMMUNICATION
SECURE BEACONING
Beaconing denotes periodic single-hop broad-
casts typically used for so-called cooperative
awareness applications. In order to create aware-
ness of other vehicles in the vicinity, every bea-
con contains information on the sender’s status
such as vehicle position, speed, and heading. The
frequency of beacon packets is expected to range
from about 10 to 1 Hz for most use cases.
Beacon messages are digitally signed and the
signer’s certificate is attached. More precisely,
after the beacon message assembly is complete
and before submitting a message m to the medi-
um access control (MAC) layer for transmission,
the sending node (V) calculates a signature
sig(m) using the private key SKjV corresponding
to the jth pseudonym PKjV currently in use. V
includes a timestamp and a geographic position
at the instant of transmission; together they are
called a geo-stamp. Beyond the signature sig(m)
that covers all these fields, V also attaches
CertA(PKjV), which attests to the validity of SK
j
V.
The receiver can verify message signatures using
PKjV in the attached certificate, CertA(PK
j
V), which
can be verified using the pre-installed public key
of CAA (Fig. 4).
These measures achieve four goals. First, the
receiver of a beacon message can verify that its
sender is a valid participant of the VC system
(either vehicle or RSU). Second, no node can
impersonate another node without compromis-
ing its HSM. Third, the integrity of the message
is protected, as manipulations are detected if the
signature is invalid. Finally, the use of the geo-
stamp, along with the signature, allows for the
detection of replay attacks. Details on replay
protection mechanisms follow in the next sec-
tion.
SECURE NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY
Cooperative awareness or safety messaging allow
vehicles to discover a frequently updated view of
other vehicles in proximity, called physical neigh-
bors. In addition, for the purpose of communica-
tion, it is important that vehicles also discover
other nodes (vehicles or RSUs) that are directly
reachable, that is, called communication neigh-
n Figure 3. Solutions of the revocation problem in VC systems.
Local monitoring (MDS),
eviction (LEAVE), and
V2V CRL distribution
RHSM and RC2RL
Distribution of CRLs,
with encoded, self-verifiable
pieces
CA
RSUA RSUB
PAPADIMITRATOS LAYOUT  10/22/08  3:54 PM  Page 106
 
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on December 1, 2008 at 14:03 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
IEEE Communications Magazine • November 2008 107
bors. Typically, it is assumed that if two nodes
are communication neighbors, they are physical
neighbors, and vice versa. However, this is not
the case, because adversaries mount relay attacks,
receiving and quickly retransmitting (replaying)
messages of remote nodes [11].
The inclusion of sender timestamp and loca-
tion, along with authentication, enables our sys-
tem to perform provably secure neighbor
discovery against external adversaries [12]. The
basic idea is to estimate the sender-receiver dis-
tance based on the system’s own coordinates,
and the location in the received message and
time of flight (difference between our own time
and the received timestamp). For a protocol-
selectable acceptable neighbor range, the receiv-
ing node accepts the sender as a communication
neighbor when the two distance estimates are
equal and the sender is authenticated. As a
result, vehicles can be ensured that their neigh-
bor table includes only nodes that are indeed
communication neighbors.
SECURE GEOCAST
The range covered by one-hop beaconing is
often not sufficient, and information on events
such as accidents needs to be disseminated in
relatively large areas. This is achieved by Geo-
cast, which comprises three elements:
• Addressing of a geographically defined des-
tination region
• Forwarding toward this region
• Distribution of the packet within the desti-
nation region
Position-based routing, that is, multihop single-
path forwarding of packets toward a geographi-
cally defined destination, has been shown to be
well suited to the dynamics of vehicular net-
works. Position-based routing is realized by
greedy routing protocols such as GPSR or
CGGC. The distribution of messages among all
nodes within the destination region can be done
by simple flooding or more efficient approaches
to multihop broadcast. In the case of simple
flooding, every node inside the destination
region rebroadcasts the message once and
records its sequence number to suppress a
rebroadcast of the same message.
As a basic security measure for both position-
based routing and message distribution, source
nodes sign created messages and then attach the
corresponding certificate, similar to the function-
ality for secure beaconing. Moreover, forwarding
nodes can also sign packets they relay so that
they can be authenticated by the next-hop relay
[5]. This way, only qualified network participants
can create messages that are accepted by others,
and message integrity is protected toward the
destination. Replay and neighbor discovery
attacks can be prevented, as discussed in the
previous section.
As beaconing is the basis for position-based
forwarding decisions, the location given in bea-
cons can be forged, with data delivery failures
(when traffic is attracted by the attacker) and an
increased network load (due to routing loops).
We propose a position verification approach,
based on plausibility heuristics, which is capable
of detecting such position falsifications [8]. Sec-
ond, changing pseudonyms for privacy reasons
leads to increased instability in nodes’ neighbor
tables. This can result in transmission faults to
the next hop, because a node is not reachable
after a pseudonym change, which deteriorates
routing performance [14]. To balance network
and privacy needs, we can extend the routing
mechanisms by a MAC layer callback that noti-
fies the routing layer about missed neighbors.
Finally, to mitigate resource depletion attacks,
with an internal adversary distributing at high
rates messages across a large destination region,
we propose rate limiting.
PSEUDONYM HANDLING
An adversary analyzing which certificates are
attached to signed messages can track the loca-
tion of vehicles over time. Hence, we propose to
load each vehicle with multiple certified public
keys (i.e., pseudonyms) it uses for short periods
of time. If pseudonyms are changed at appropri-
ate times and locations, messages signed under
different pseudonyms are hard to link by an
adversary.
As the adversary could use information from
other layers of the communication stack to track
vehicles (e.g., MAC, IP), a change of pseudonym
should be accompanied by a change of the vehi-
cle identifiers in underlying protocols as well.
Still, using the location contained in messages to
match pseudonyms, an adversary can indirectly
identify vehicles by predicting the next position
of a vehicle even if a vehicle has a new
pseudonym. The cloaking of location informa-
tion [4] is not a solution as it would jeopardize
the use of safety applications. In [2] we propose
that vehicles change pseudonyms in regions not
monitored by an adversary. These regions are
called mix zones [1] because by changing
pseudonyms the vehicles mix with each other.
We also suggest that vehicles change their
pseudonym at regular intervals to maximize the
probability of changing pseudonyms in a mix
zone. In [3] we explore another approach that
creates unmonitored regions by encrypting com-
munications (i.e., cryptographic mix zones) in
small regions with the help of the road infra-
structure.
The general idea of mix zones is explained as
follows. If only one vehicle changes its
pseudonym in a mix zone, an adversary observ-
ing vehicles entering and exiting the region
would trivially track vehicles because only one
pseudonym has changed. But if more than one
vehicle change their pseudonyms in a mix zone,
the adversary should consider every possible
match for entering and exiting vehicles, and esti-
n Figure 4. Example of secure communication: secure beaconing.
Beacon packet
Header: H1. Generate signature
with SK1
2. Append certificate
3. Send packet
1. Validate certificate (if
    not previously done)
2. Validate signature
3. Validate geo-stamp in
    the header
4. Accept/reject packet
Payload: m
Sig(SK1, H, m)
Cert(PK1)
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mate the most likely matches given its belief
about the mobility of vehicles, the time to tra-
verse the mix zone, and the geometry of the mix
zone (Fig. 5). An adversary would thus find sev-
eral possible matches weighted with different
probabilities. To measure the amount of location
privacy achieved by vehicles in the mix zone, we
capture the uncertainty of the adversary with the
notion of entropy as defined in [15]. With this
metric, if all possible matches look equally likely
to an adversary, (i.e., the mix zone is very unpre-
dictable), the adversary would be highly ineffi-
cient in tracking vehicles. In general, the more
vehicles there are in a mix zone, the more diffi-
cult it is for an adversary to obtain a good esti-
mation of probabilities as many combinations
are possible. If the mobility of the vehicles is
such that they are equally likely to enter/exit the
mix zone from any road, it would be difficult for
the adversary to obtain precise predictions.
When vehicles change pseudonyms in unmon-
itored regions of the network, mix zones are
large and it is difficult for an adversary to obtain
good estimations. However, when mix zones are
created by the use of cryptography, they tend to
be smaller, and thus must be located appropri-
ately to maximize their effectiveness (e.g., at
traffic intersections). Hence, linking messages
signed under different pseudonyms becomes
increasingly hard over time and space for an
adversary. As vehicles change pseudonyms sever-
al times before reaching their destinations, the
adversary will accumulate more uncertainty, sim-
ilar to a mix network [15], mobile nodes can
achieve a high level of location privacy.
CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a security architecture for
VC systems, aiming at a solution that is both
comprehensive and practical. We have studied
systematically the problem at hand, identifying
threats and models of adversarial behavior, as
well as security and privacy requirements that are
relevant to the VC context. We have introduced
a range of mechanisms, to handle identity and
credential management, and to secure communi-
cation while enhancing privacy. In the second
article of this contribution we discuss implemen-
tation and performance aspects, present a gamut
of research investigations and results toward fur-
ther strengthening secure VC systems and
addressing the remaining research challenges.
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